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Abstract
Unlike many analysis of tax effects on consolidated household/government
debts in a monetary union, this paper builds up analysis from a consoli-
dated budget constraint, instead of starting from a model. By a monetary
union, it is assumed that all nations in the union share same currency.
Also, if taxes are assumed to be in real values, or if one assumes that gov-
ernment targets real value of taxes T/P , then it is also possible to produce
the size of fiscal multiplier on real value of consolidated debts, if relaxed
version of classical dichotomy - that agents’ decisions are only affected by
real variables - is assumed. This paper argues that size is db/dtr = −1
where tr is real value of taxes or “real taxes” and b = B/(PR) where
B = −D with D nominal debt, P price and R− 1 nominal interest rate ,
or in terms of real debts, dd/dtr = 1.
1 Budget Constraint Analysis
A nation being analyzed is in a monetary union with some other nations. Thus,
inside these nations, there is no exchange rate mechanism. For simplification,
there are only consumption goods in an economy, without any capital goods.
The nation faces the following consolidated households/government budget con-
straint, assuming such an emergent budget constraint exists:
PtCt + Tt +
Bt
Rt
≤WtNt + Πt +Bt−1 (1)
where P is price level, C is consumption, T is net taxes, W is nominal wage,
Rt − 1 is nominal interest rate, Πt is firms’ profits all distributed as dividends,
Xt is net export. Bt is net one-time bond holding, with Bt < 0 implying net
indebtedness. It will be assumed that the agents in the economy do not hold
any bond for simplification purposes. It will be assumed for rest of analysis that
T ≥ 0 with assumption of zero government spending. Also, for simplification,
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import M will be assumed to be zero, and all nations are assumed to be in a
monetary union. P > 0 for an obvious reason. Bt−1 is assumed to be given.
Assuming that the markets clear, WtNt + Πt = Pt (Ct +Xt). Thus, Equation
1 becomes with equality:
PtCt + Tt +
Bt
Rt
= Pt (Ct + Xt) + Bt−1 (2)
Thus,
Tt +
Bt
Rt
= PtXt + Bt−1 (3)
Tt
Pt
+
Bt
PtRt
= Xt +
Bt−1
Pt
(4)
Let us define bt =
Bt
PtRt
.
bt = Xt +
Bt−1
Pt
− Tt
Pt
(5)
Define relationships as in the Figure:
b
T
P
X
The above diagram shows that b = b(X,P, T ), X = X(P ), P = P (T ). The
underlying idea is that increase or decrease in taxes affect P , exports are as-
sumed to only depend on price of goods - which is a reasonable assumption
given that all export demands are honored, that all nations are in a monetary
union, and that quality of goods or technology does not suddenly improve solely
by increasing taxes, and inverse net indebtedness obviously depends on X,P, T .
Thus,
dbt
dTt
=
∂bt
∂Xt
∂Xt
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Tt
+
∂bt
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂Tt
+
∂bt
∂Tt
(6)
Recall Equation 5:
bt = Xt +
Bt−1
Pt
− Tt
Pt
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∂bt
∂Tt
= − 1
Pt
(7)
∂bt
∂Xt
= 1 (8)
∂bt
∂Pt
= −Bt−1
Pt
2 +
Tt
Pt
2 (9)
Thus,
dbt
dTt
=
[
−Bt−1
Pt
2 +
Tt
Pt
2 +
∂Xt
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Tt
− 1
Pt
(10)
It is assumed that ∂Xt∂Pt < 0 and for our interests, Tt ≥ 0.
• ∂Pt∂Tt < 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
> −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1. Then, dbtdTt <
0. Real value of debts increase when taxes are raised.
• ∂Pt∂Tt < 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
< −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1.
Also,
[
−Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
+ ∂Xt∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Tt
< 1Pt . Then still
dbt
dTt
< 0.
• ∂Pt∂Tt < 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
< −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1.
Also,
[
−Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
+ ∂Xt∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Tt
> 1Pt . Then,
dbt
dTt
> 0.
• If ∂Pt∂Tt = 0, then dbtdTt < 0.
• ∂Pt∂Tt > 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
< −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1. Then, dbtdTt <
0.
• ∂Pt∂Tt > 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
> −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1.
Also,
[
−Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
+ ∂Xt∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Tt
< 1Pt . Then still
dbt
dTt
< 0.
• ∂Pt∂Tt > 0, −
Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
> −∂Xt∂Pt at initial Xt, Pt, Tt, Bt, Bt−1.
Also,
[
−Bt−1
Pt2
+ Tt
Pt2
+ ∂Xt∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂Tt
> 1Pt . Then,
dbt
dTt
> 0.
Now, let us change Equation 5 into:
bt = Xt +
Bt−1
Pt
− tr,t (11)
where tr,t = Tt/Pt, real taxes. b = b(X,P, tr), X = X(P ), P = P (tr).
dbt
dtr,t
=
∂bt
∂Xt
∂Xt
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂tr,t
+
∂bt
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂tr,t
+
∂bt
∂tr,t
(12)
∂bt
∂tr,t
= −1 (13)
∂bt
∂Xt
= 1 (14)
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∂bt
∂Pt
= −Bt−1
Pt
2 (15)
dbt
dtr,t
=
[
−Bt−1
Pt
2 +
∂Xt
∂Pt
]
∂Pt
∂tr,t
− 1 (16)
Now I will introduce a relaxed version of classical dichotomy. Even under many
sticky-price models, price level itself is irrelevant, as long as some real variables
remain adjusted. Let new Pn,t = kPt. Then, one needs to adjust Bt−1, Bt
and Tt to reflect the change. Bn,t−1 = kBt−1, Bn,t = kBt, Tn,t = kTt, with
initial equilibria adjusted appropriately. But tr,t does not change under price
level transformation, and similarly bt does not change. Let k → ∞. Then,
−Bn,t−1
Pn,t2
→ 0. Thus,
dbt
dtr,t
=
∂Xt
∂Pt
∂Pt
∂tr,t
− 1 (17)
But ∂Xt∂Pt
∂Pt
∂tr,t
is invariant relative to price level transformation. Then the prob-
lem appears: −Bt−1
Pt2
is non-zero and finite whenever k 6= 0,∞. If ∂Pt∂tr,t is finite
too, then dbtdtr,t no longer remains invariant relative to price level transformation.
Thus, three choices:
• | ∂Pt∂tr,t | =∞ all the time
• ∂Pt∂tr,t = 0 all the time
• ∂Xt∂Pt = −∞ all the time
If the second choice is made,
dbt
dtr,t
= −1 (18)
The first choice brings an interesting conclusion: that raising real taxes explodes
nominal value, and if the government cares also about monetary/nominal sta-
bility, then real taxes cannot be set exogenously and thus are endogenous.
The third choice implies that exports are extremely sensitive to price change.
This can be expected in an economy where every good is homogeneous and mar-
ket is perfectly competitive. However, if any form of monopolistic competition
exists, then the third choice is likely not true.
